We offer a natural and extensible measure-theoretic treatment of missingness at random. Within the standard missing data framework, we give a novel characterisation of the observed data as a stopping-set sigma algebra. We demonstrate that the usual missingness at random conditions are equivalent to requiring particular stochastic processes to be adapted to a set-indexed filtration of the complete data: measurability conditions that suffice to ensure the likelihood factorisation necessary for ignorability. Our rigorous statement of the missing at random conditions also clarifies a common confusion: what is fixed, and what is random?
Introduction
Missing at random (Rubin, 1976 ) is a central concept in missing data research. Nevertheless, recent papers (Seaman et al., 2013; Mealli & Rubin, 2015; Doretti et al., 2017) have argued that it remains poorly understood and often inaccurately articulated. The most common formulation (Little & Rubin, 2002, p.12 ) is superficially intuitive but misleading in its details; accurate formulations exist (Robins & Gill, 1997) but typically hold little heuristic appeal.
Our ambition here is to provide both rigour and intuition. We show that the factorization required for ignorability depends on the data-measurability of the likelihood ratio between two probability measures. The data themselves can be understood as a stopping-set sigma algebra arising from a particular filtration of the probability space. We give an explicit characterisation of two families of probability measures: the first describes the measure assumed to be operating in practice, while the second is a conditional version of the first under a particular working independence assumption. We shall show that their likelihood ratio is itself a stochastic process evaluated at a stopping set, measurable if the underlying process is adapted. This leads directly to a rigorous definition of missingness at random, but one that retains the familiarity and simple appeal of the usual formulation. Along the way, we draw out some deeper connections between missing data problems and causal inference. Rigour is relative. The level of formality we adopt is chosen for clarity in matters we believe to be most important or least well understood. For example, we express conditioning statements in terms of sigma algebras, principally to avoid any confusion over precisely what information is being conditioned upon. The fact that not only discrete but also continuous or more general random variables can then be subsumed within our setup is convenient, but secondary.
We tread this path with some trepidation. Rubin describes his own initial measure-theoretic treatment of missing data as "window dressing", and thenBiometrika-editor David Cox's advice to him was to "eliminate all that measure theory noise" (Rubin, 2014) . We hope that our stochastic process perspective avoids these pitfalls, and instead succeeds in exposing a real signal that could to be overlooked following such noise reduction.
Notation
Our starting point is a measurable space (Ω, F ) on which we define various probability measures and random variables. We denote probability measures by P and Q, possibly indexed by a parameter θ in order to describe families of such measures. We assume that all such probability measures are dominated by a known reference measure ν: that is, if ν(A) = 0 for some set A ∈ F , then also P (A) = Q(A) = 0. Following Pollard (2002), we adopt de Finetti notation: where the context allows it, we interpret a set A as the random variable 1 A , and we re-use the symbol P for its corresponding expectation operator E P . Thus
The sigma algebra F represents complete information about the entire stochastic system. We think of the information provided by the observed data, too, as a sigma algebra, and denote it by D. This sigma algebra D should contain all those events whose logical status is known once the realised values of the observed data are known. For the time being, we shall remain nebulous about the precise definition of D but, given the missing data setting, we shall expect D to be a strict subset of F .
The usual definition of the likelihood function is in terms of the Radon-Nikodym derivative dP θ /dν: the density of P θ with respect to a dominating reference measure ν. This density is a random variable that, for fixed ω ∈ Ω, is to be understood as a function of θ. However, this random variable is not, in general, D-measurable: in other words, dP θ /dν is the likelihood based on all information in F , and may depend on events whose truth or fiction cannot be determined from the observed data D. Such a quantity is sometimes referred to as the complete data likelihood. By contrast, the observed data likelihood may be conveniently represented by ν(dP θ /dν | D): given D, the conditional expectation with respect to ν of the complete data likelihood (Commenges & Gegout-Petit, 2005) . This has the intuitive appeal of a local average of the complete data density over the area of the sample space consistent with the observed data. As noted by Chang & Pollard (1997, p.299) , it is also more economical than the standard notation f dy mis , since no y mis need be introduced.
Ignorability
Missingness at random is fundamentally concerned with ignorability: when can two families of probability measures be used interchangeably for likelihood-based inference about θ? We shall make the natural definition and assert that the families (P θ ) and (Q θ ) are everywhere equivalent for inference about θ if, for all θ, θ ′ ,
so that the two likelihood ratios are identical. Here and elsewhere, equality should be understood almost surely. More simply, writing f and g respectively for the observed-data likelihood functions based on P and Q, we are making the obvious assertion that P and Q are equivalent for inference about θ if it is always the case that
It may happen that everywhere equivalence does not hold, but that the two families are equivalent on a subset A ∈ D. Formally, (P θ ) and (Q θ ) are equivalent on A ∈ D for inference about θ if, for all θ, θ ′ ,
recall that A is to be interpreted here as 1 A . This equality ensures that, for any ω ∈ A, the realized values of likelihood ratios computed under P θ and Q θ are identical. We now establish a simple condition under which families of probability measures are equivalent in this sense.
Lemma 1
The families (P θ ) and (Q θ ) are equivalent on A ∈ D for inference about θ if A × dP θ /dQ θ is D-measurable and does not vary with θ. The families are everywhere equivalent if dP θ /dQ θ is D-measurable and does not vary with θ.
The proof is fairly direct: decomposing dP θ /dν as dP θ /dQ θ ×dQ θ /dν, A ∈ D is brought inside the conditional expectations of the definition and then A× dP θ /dQ θ taken outside since, by assumption, it is D-measurable. More explicitly,
where the final cancellation of the two Radon-Nikodym derivatives follows from the assumption that these do not vary with θ. Taking A = Ω, a trivial corollary is that (P θ ) and (Q θ ) are everywhere equivalent if dP θ /dQ θ is D-measurable and does not vary with θ.
Reducing ignorability to a question about data-measurability of a likelihood ratio such as dP θ /dQ θ is a very general idea. Indeed, to this point, we have made no mention of missing data, and in fact the theory applies equally well in settings where the observed data arise in a random fashion but unobserved quantities are not thought of as data but simply as latent variables: random effects, for example. This is the perspective taken by Farewell et al. (2017) .
Henceforth we shall suppress dependence on θ, and consider conditions under which the measures P and Q implicitly defined by Rubin (1976) satisfy this condition for inferential equivalence.
Monotone Missing Data 4.1 Data
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we employ the machinery and methods of stochastic processes. For general missing data, the theory of stochastic processes indexed by sets will be required (Molchanov, 2006) . Here we begin with the gentler case of monotone missingness, where it suffices to use standard theory for stochastic processes in discrete time. Unlike other approaches, the stochastic process perspective permits ideas to be extended from the monotone case to the general setting with essentially trivial, semantic modifications. Following Rubin (1976) , we let Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) be random variables defined on (Ω, F ), the ranges of which may be any measurable spaces. We observe Y 1 , . . . , Y M , where the random variable M satisfies 0 ≤ M ≤ n; we do not observe Y M+1 , . . . , Y n . Observation of the stochastic process Y is terminated at the random time M.
A filtration is a nested family of sigma algebras that, heuristically, captures the idea of information increase over time. 
Probability Measures
We write P for the probability measure that we believe gives rise to the data. As Seaman et al. (2013) point out, P need not actually be the true data generating measure; P and Q are models, and ignorability asks whether we can substitute the simpler model Q for the more complex model P while obtaining identical inference about θ. We assume that those aspects of P concerned with specifying the marginal distribution of M are of little scientific interest and, were Y and M independent, we would happily base our inference on the conditional likelihood of Y given M, since this really only involves modelling the marginal distribution of Y .
However, we concede that, under P , the random variables Y and M may in fact have a complicated dependence. Under what conditions can we make a working assumption of independence between Y and M, use the associated conditional likelihood, and still draw the same inferences as we would were we to use the full likelihood given by P ?
Specifically, let Q be any probability measure that dominates P , agrees with P on Y, but under which Y and M are in fact independent. That is, we assume that P (A) = Q(A) for all A ∈ Y, and that Q(A ∩ B) = Q(A)Q(B) for any A ∈ Y, B ∈ M. We shall assume that at least one such Q exists; this depends essentially on (Ω, F ) having a suitable product structure. Denote by
Our central question is this: under what conditions are the likelihoods based on P and Q
′ equivalent for inference about θ? Somewhat less explicitly, this is the question asked by Rubin (1976) . We remark that our use of Q ′ to characterize a conditional likelihood under a working independence assumption is slightly different to that of Rubin (1976) . Rubin's approach is to define the working likelihood through a random probability measure that varies with M, under which the observed pattern of missing data is guaranteed to occur. We feel that our definition is more charitable to the missing data community: a working independence assumption seems more defensible than a pretense that the observed pattern of missingness was the only possibility. Another advantage is that our theory can more easily be extended to cases where the range of M is uncountable; this is not the case for the standard presentation (Commenges & Gegout-Petit, 2005, p.14) . In practice, though, the two approaches are equivalent.
We can be more specific about the relationship between P and Q ′ . The RadonNikodym derivative dP /dQ is given by λ/µ, where λ and µ are conditional densities of M given Y under P and Q, respectively. This is an emphatically causal notion (Pearl, 2009 ): we replace the conditional distribution of M given Y under P with an alternative that does not depend on Y, calling the resulting measure Q. The relationship between Q and Q ′ is simpler still: dQ/dQ ′ = µ, because under Q the marginal density of M and the conditional density of M given Y are both µ. Consequently, dP /dQ ′ = dP /dQ × dQ/dQ ′ = λ. We deduce that P and Q ′ are equivalent for inference if λ is data-measurable and does not vary with θ.
Measurability
We have characterized λ, the likelihood ratio between P and Q ′ , as the conditional density of M given Y: that is, λ = λ M , where for each m, λ m = P (M = m | Y). Looked at another way, λ is the value taken by the stochastic process (λ m ) at the random time M.
This provides a direct route to the question of data measurability or, more explicitly, F M -measurability. For an (F m )-stopping time M, standard stochastic process theory asserts that λ M is F M -measurable if the process (λ m ) is adapted to the filtration (F m ): adaptedness means that each λ m is F m -measurable. But since λ m = P (M = m | Y) must necessarily be Y-measurable, for it to additionally be F m -measurable it must in fact be measurable with respect to (Y ∧ F m ), the largest sigma algebra contained in both. But Y ∧ F m = Y m , so in turn we must have
This is equivalent to the everywhere version of missingness at random (Seaman et al., 2013) , about which we make several comments. First, its appearance is familiar. It looks strikingly similar to the ubiquitous, informal definition (Little & Rubin, 2002 ), yet its interpretation is rather different: the condition applies to a sequence of fixed values m, not the random variable M. Second, its appearance is simple, particularly when contrasted with the rigorous definition given by Seaman et al. (2013) ; by conditioning on sub-sigma algebras, we automatically demand that the equality hold for all possible data consistent with the observed subset Y 1 , . . . , Y m . Third, it applies equally well to a random variable Y taking values in uncountable spaces: no conditioning on a set of measure zero is required. Weaker versions of this condition are possible, which we now briefly discuss.
Realised MAR
It is useful to distinguish between everywhere and realised versions of missingness at random since, for Bayesian or direct-likelihood inference, only the realised likelihood function is relevant (Doretti et al., 2017) . We consider the question of realised ignorability with reference to the largest set A ∈ D for which Aλ is D-measurable, which we may define as the union of all sets satisfying this measurability condition. Although it may have measure zero, this set is never empty: certainly {M = n} ⊆ A, since the set {M = n} is F M -measurable and the stochastic process ({m = n}λ m ) is adapted to (F m ), since λ n = P (M = n | Y) = P (M = n | Y n ) is a tautology. If ω happens to fall in such a set A, then likelihood inference can proceed equivalently based on Q ′ instead of P .
Non-monotone missing data
We turn now to the general case, where there need be no natural ordering of the Y i : the observations may be obtained simultaneously or in an arbitrary order that is unknown to the observer. The variables themselves may be of different types: some binary, some continuous, some multivariate, and any possible subset of the variables may be observed. Despite this generality, remarkably few notational changes are needed from the ordered, monotone case: we simply reinterpret what we have written to this point in terms of stochastic processes indexed by sets (Molchanov, 2006, p.334) . Our subscript i becomes a set, so that if i = {1, 3, 4} then
The most important change from the monotone case is this: we now understand M as a random subset of {1, . . . , n}, representing the subset of variables that are observed. There is, of course, no total ordering of the subsets of {1, . . . , n}, but we exploit the partial ordering given by set inclusion. That is, we interpret i ≤ m as i ⊆ m, which describes a lattice on which the stochastic process Y is defined. Once again, we stop observing Y at the random point M on this lattice, but now there are potentially multiple routes by which we may arrive at a given point. Just as before, however, we observe the values of all random variables Y i for which i ≤ m.
We define
and F m = Y m ∨ M m just as before, where now (F m ) is a set-indexed filtration. Again as before, D = F M , a stopping set sigma algebra. The probability measures P , Q and Q ′ are unaltered in their definitions, and the question of ignorability remains one of F M -measurability of λ = λ M , where λ m = P (M = m | Y). The everywhere missing at random condition, too, is unaltered, and forms our central theorem, which we now state formally.
Let Q ≫ P agree with P on Y and, under Q, let Y and M be independent. Define Q ′ from Q as a regular conditional probability given M, and let
The proof is identical to the monotone case: adaptedness of the process (λ m ) to the filtration (F m ) and the fact that M is an (F m )-stopping time ensures that λ = λ M is F M -measurable, as required. Even in this general and unordered setting, the techniques and intuition of stochastic processes provide us with a direct proof of data-measurability of the likelihood ratio dP /dQ ′ . The crucial point is adaptedness of the stochastic process (λ m ): ignorability hangs on this natural condition.
Discussion
At least initially, our aim in writing this paper was simply to provide a rigorous reinterpretation of the usual missingness at random formulation P (M | Y ) = P (M | Y obs ) for those who, like ourselves, worry about such things. We hope that our version, Missingness at random is thus certainly not a conditional independence requirement (Mealli & Rubin, 2015) . To our knowledge, our characterization of missingness at random as a measurability requirement and, in particular, as an adaptedness requirement, is novel. The adaptedness condition is sufficient and nearly necessary: for a stopping time M, a random variable λ is F M -measurable if and only if there exists an adapted stochastic process (X m ) such that λ = X M , so minimally λ M = X M for some adapted process (X m ). We hope that the adaptedness requirement will seem natural to those familiar with the theory of stochastic processes, within which stochastic observation is very well developed, and with which too few connections with missing data have been made. For instance, the celebrated partial likelihood of survival analysis (Cox, 1975 ) may be derived instead as a conditional likelihood under a working independence assumption between censoring, timings of failures and those individuals selected to fail. Under weak assumptions about censoring, inference about the regression parameters under the partial likelihood and the full model would be ignorably different but for the fact that these parameters are shared between both the timing and selection components of the model. This is a good example of a case where dP θ /dQ θ does in fact vary with θ.
Standard terminology speaks of missing at random 'mechanisms'. This is distinctly causal language of which we approve, but the conditional density of M given Y does not necessarily have a natural causal interpretation: in longitudinal settings, it seems highly unlikely that future observations, however interpreted, should be allowed to causally influence the occurrence of previous measurements, even in principle. Conditional densities along more dynamic filtrations such as {∅, Ω} = F 0 ⊆ F 0 ∨ Y 1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ F n−1 ⊆ F n−1 ∨ Y n ⊆ F n = F could have more direct causal interpretation, and the relevant likelihood ratio would be a product of Radon-Nikodym derivatives of regular conditional probabilities, measurable if in fact the transitions from F m−1 ∨ Y m to F m depended only on F m−1 : sequential missingness at random. Our suspicion is that if we started with a more appropriate causal model, conditions for ignorability would be more easily assessed, and more often deemed implausible.
More broadly, the key point remains one of data-measurability of a likelihood ratio: a very general idea that goes beyond ideas of missing data to encompass partially observed, coarsened or entirely latent stochastic processes (Commenges & Gegout-Petit, 2005) . Defining filtrations on these richer spaces designed to have a causal interpretation seems to us a promising approach: among other things, it allows for the possibility that the thing to be measured can exist without a measurement taking place (Farewell et al., 2017) . Each ω ∈ Ω corresponds to a realisation of an entire suite of random variables; even for a single individual, there is no particular reason that their observed Y 1 in a realisation in which M = {1} should be the same Y 1 as that from a realisation where M = {1, . . . , n}.
We make use of random sets to extend the theory of monotone missing data to general patterns of missingness. The lattice structure implicit in this formulation is strongly reminiscent of the randomized monotone missingness mechanisms of Robins & Gill (1997) , wherein future observation can depend on previous measurements within the history of a particular branch. We believe, but have not proved, that the distinction between randomized monotone missingness and general missingness at random lies in the existence of incomparable sets m, m ′ , for which neither m ≤ m ′ nor m ′ ≤ m.
